

Verification of Chase-Lev work-stealing deque


Clément Allain
François Pottier

May 15, 2023

Context: scheduler for task-based parallelism

- ▶ Cilk (C, C++)
- ▶ Threading Building Blocks (C++)
- ▶ Taskflow (C++)
- ▶ Tokio (RUST)
- ▶ Goroutines (Go)
- ▶ Domainslib (OCAML 5)

Work-stealing



Chase-Lev work-stealing deque

1. *The Implementation of the Cilk-5 Multithreaded Language.*
Frigo, Leiserson & Randall (1998).
 - ▶ lock
2. *Thread Scheduling for Multiprogrammed Multiprocessors.*
Arora, Blumofe & Plaxton (1998).
 - ▶ non-blocking
 - ▶ one fixed size array, potential overflow
3. *A dynamic-sized nonblocking work stealing deque.*
Hendler, Lev, Moir, & Shavit (2004).
 - ▶ non-blocking
 - ▶ list of small arrays, no overflow
4. *Dynamic circular work-stealing deque.*
Chase & Lev (2005).
 - ▶ non-blocking
 - ▶ circular arrays, no overflow

Why is it interesting?

- ▶ Demonstration of Iris on a (simplified) real-life concurrent data structure.
- ▶ Rich ghost state to enforce a subtle protocol.
 - ▶ logical state \neq physical state
 - ▶ external future-dependent linearization point
- ▶ Nontrivial use of prophecy variables.

The rest of this talk

- ▶ Specification using logically atomic triples.
- ▶ Rough idea of how the data structure works.
- ▶ Why we need prophecy variables.

Specification

Physical state

Logical state

Prophecy variables

Specification — chaselev_make

$$\frac{\{ \text{True} \}}{\text{chaselev_make} ()}$$

$$\{ \lambda t. \text{chaselev-inv } t \text{ } \nu * \text{chaselev-model } t \text{ } [] * \text{chaselev-owner } t \}$$

Specification — chaselev_make

$$\frac{\{ \text{True} \}}{\text{chaselev_make} ()}$$

$$\left\{ \lambda t. \text{chaselev-inv } t \ \iota * \text{chaselev-model } t \ \square * \text{chaselev-owner } t \right\}$$



t is an instance of Chase-Lev deque.
Enforces a protocol (using an Iris invariant).

Specification — chaselev_make

$$\frac{\{ \text{True} \}}{\text{chaselev_make} ()}$$

$$\left\{ \lambda t. \text{chaselev-inv } t \nu * \text{chaselev-model } t [] * \text{chaselev-owner } t \right\}$$



Asserts the list of values that t logically contains.

Specification — chaselev_make

$$\frac{\{ \text{True} \}}{\text{chaselev_make} ()}$$

$$\left\{ \lambda t. \text{chaselev-inv } t \text{ } \iota * \text{chaselev-model } t \text{ } [] * \text{chaselev-owner } t \right\}$$


Gives the owner exclusive access to his end of t .

Specification — chaselev_push

$$\frac{\left\{ \text{chaselev-inv } t \ i \ * \ \text{chaselev-owner } t \right\}}{\frac{\left\langle \forall vs. \ \text{chaselev-model } t \ vs \right\rangle}{\frac{\text{chaselev_push } t \ v, \uparrow i}{\left\langle \exists. \ \text{chaselev-model } t \ (vs \uplus [v]) \right\rangle}}}\left\{ () . \ \text{chaselev-owner } t \right\}$$

Specification — chaselev_push

Specification of a concurrent operation (\simeq transaction):
standard triple + logically atomic triple

$$\frac{\frac{\frac{\{ P \}}{\langle \forall \bar{x}. \textcolor{teal}{P}_{\text{lin}} \rangle}}{\frac{e, \mathcal{E}}{\frac{\langle \exists \bar{y}. \textcolor{teal}{Q}_{\text{lin}} \rangle}{\{ \text{res. } Q \}}}}}$$

P : private precondition

Q : private postcondition

P_{lin} : public precondition

Q_{lin} : public postcondition

Specification — chaselev_push

For a concurrent data structure:


$$\frac{\frac{\frac{\{ \text{???-inv } \dots * P \}}{\langle \forall \bar{x}. \text{???-model } \dots \rangle}}{\overline{e, \mathcal{E}}}}{\frac{\langle \exists \bar{y}. \text{???-model } \dots \rangle}{\{ \text{res. } Q \}}}}$$

Specification — chaselev_push

$$\frac{\left\{ \text{chaselev-inv } t \ i \ * \ \text{chaselev-owner } t \right\}}{\frac{\left\langle \forall vs. \ \text{chaselev-model } t \ vs \right\rangle}{\frac{\text{chaselev_push } t \ v, \uparrow i}{\left\langle \exists. \ \text{chaselev-model } t \ (vs + [v]) \right\rangle}}}}{\left\{ () . \ \text{chaselev-owner } t \right\}}$$


t is an instance of Chase-Lev deque.

Specification — chaselev_push

$$\frac{\left\{ \text{chaselev-inv } t \ i \ * \ \text{chaselev-owner } t \right\}}{\langle \forall vs. \text{ chaselev-model } t \ vs \rangle} \quad \frac{}{\text{chaselev_push } t \ \gamma, \uparrow i} \quad \frac{\langle \exists. \text{ chaselev-model } t \ (vs + [v]) \rangle}{\left\{ () . \text{ chaseley-owner } t \right\}}$$


This operation is reserved to the owner of t .

Specification — chaselev_push



v is atomically pushed at the owner's end of t .

Specification — chaselev_pop


$$\frac{\overline{\left\{ \text{chaselev-inv } t \iota * \text{chaselev-owner } t \right\}}}{\overline{\left\langle \forall vs. \text{chaselev-model } t vs \right\rangle}} \overline{\text{chaselev_pop } t, \uparrow \iota} \overline{\left\langle \exists o. \bigvee \left[\begin{array}{l} vs = [] * o = \text{NONE} * \text{chaselev-model } t [] \\ \exists v, vs'. vs = vs' \uplus [v] * o = \text{SOME } v * \text{chaselev-model } t vs' \end{array} \right] \right\rangle} \left\{ o. \text{chaselev-owner } t \right\}$$

Specification — chaselev_pop

$$\frac{\begin{array}{c} \left\{ \text{chaselev-inv } t \iota * \text{chaselev-owner } t \right\} \\ \hline \left\langle \forall vs. \text{chaselev-model } t vs \right\rangle \\ \hline \text{chaselev_pop } t, \uparrow \iota \\ \hline \left\langle \exists o. \vee \left[\begin{array}{l} vs = [] * o = \text{NONE} * \text{chaselev-model } t [] \\ \exists v, vs'. vs = vs' + [v] * o = \text{SOME } v * \text{chaselev-model } t vs' \end{array} \right] \right\rangle \\ \hline \left\{ o. \text{chaselev-owner } t \right\} \end{array}}{t \text{ is an instance of Chase-Lev deque.}}$$

Specification — chaselev_pop

$$\frac{\begin{array}{c} \left\{ \text{chaselev-inv } t \ i \ * \ \text{chaselev-owner } t \right\} \\ \hline \left\langle \forall vs. \ \text{chaselev-model } t \ vs \right\rangle \\ \hline \text{chaselev_pop } t, \uparrow i \end{array}}{\left\langle \exists o. \ \bigvee \left[\begin{array}{l} vs = [] * o = \text{NONE} * \text{chaselev-model } t [] \\ \exists v, vs'. vs = vs' + [v] * o = \text{SOME } v * \text{chaselev-model } t vs' \end{array} \right] \right\rangle}$$




This operation is reserved to the owner of t .

Specification — chaselev_pop

$$\frac{\overline{\left\{ \text{chaselev-inv } t \iota * \text{chaselev-owner } t \right\}}}{\overline{\left\langle \forall vs. \text{chaselev-model } t vs \right\rangle}} \text{chaselev_pop } t, \uparrow \iota \quad \overline{\left\langle \exists o. \vee \left[\begin{array}{l} vs = [] * o = \text{NONE} * \text{chaselev-model } t [] \\ \exists v, vs'. vs = vs' + [v] * o = \text{SOME } v * \text{chaselev-model } t vs' \end{array} \right] \right\rangle}$$

$\left\{ o. \text{chaselev-owner } t \right\}$



Either 1) t is seen empty
or 2) some value v is atomically popped at the owner's end of t .

Specification — chaselev_steal

$$\frac{\begin{array}{c} \left\{ \text{chaselev-inv } t \ i \right\} \\ \hline \left\langle \forall vs. \text{ chaselev-model } t \ vs \right\rangle \\ \hline \text{chaselev_steal } t, \uparrow i \end{array}}{\left\langle \exists o. \bigvee \left[\begin{array}{l} vs = [] * o = \text{NONE} * \text{chaselev-model } t [] \\ \exists v, vs'. vs = v :: vs' * o = \text{SOME } v * \text{chaselev-model } t \ vs' \end{array} \right] \right\rangle}$$
$$\left\{ o. \text{True} \right\}$$

Specification — chaselev_steal

$$\frac{\begin{array}{c} \left\{ \text{chaselev-inv } t \ i \right\} \\ \hline \left\langle \forall vs. \text{ chaselev-model } t \ vs \right\rangle \\ \hline \text{chaselev-steal } t, \uparrow i \\ \hline \left\langle \exists o. \vee \left[\begin{array}{l} vs = [] * o = \text{NONE} * \text{chaselev-model } t [] \\ \exists v, vs'. vs = v :: vs' * o = \text{SOME } v * \text{chaselev-model } t \ vs' \end{array} \right] \right\rangle \\ \{ o | \text{True} \} \end{array}}{t \text{ is an instance of Chase-Lev deque.}}$$

Specification — chaselev_steal

$$\frac{\begin{array}{c} \left\{ \text{chaselev-inv } t \ i \right\} \\ \hline \left\langle \forall vs. \text{ chaselev-model } t \ vs \right\rangle \end{array}}{\text{chaselev_steal } t, \uparrow i}$$
$$\frac{\left\langle \exists o. \vee \left[\begin{array}{l} vs = [] * o = \text{NONE} * \text{chaselev-model } t [] \\ \exists v, vs'. vs = v :: vs' * o = \text{SOME } v * \text{chaselev-model } t \ vs' \end{array} \right] \right\rangle}{\{ o. \text{ True} \}}$$

Either 1) t is seen empty

or 2) some value v is atomically popped at the thieves' end of t .

Specification

Physical state

Logical state


Prophecy variables

Physical state



data: infinite array storing all values

Physical state




data: infinite array storing all values

front: *monotone* index for thieves' end

Physical state


data {

CHASELEVFRONTLBGET




data: in
front: m


CHASELEVFRONTVALID



CHASELEVFRONTUPDATE



Physical state




data: infinite array storing all values

front: *monotone* index for thieves' end

back: index for owner's end

Physical state




data: infinite array storing all values

front: *monotone* index for thieves' end

back: index for owner's end

priv: list of private values (controlled by owner)

Physical state



data: infinite array storing all values


front: *monotone* index for thieves' end

back: index for owner's end

priv: list of private values (controlled by owner)

model: list of contained values

Physical state



data: infinite array storing all values

front: *monotone* index for thieves' end

back: index for owner's end

priv: list of private values (controlled by owner)

model: list of contained values

hist: *monotone* list of history values

Physical state

data {

CHASELEVHISTLBGET

$\gamma.\text{hist}$

• *hist*

$\gamma.\text{hist}$

○ *hist*

data: in

CHASELEVHISTVALID

front: *m*

$\gamma.\text{hist}$

• *hist₁*

$\gamma.\text{hist}$

○ *hist₂*

back: in

hist₂ $\sqsubseteq_{\text{prefix}}$ *hist₁*

priv: lis

CHASELEVHISTUPDATE

model: lis

$\gamma.\text{hist}$


hist: *m*

• *hist*

$\gamma.\text{hist}$

• (*hist* + [v])

Physical state



data: infinite array storing all values

front: *monotone* index for thieves' end

back: index for owner's end

priv: list of private values (controlled by owner)

model: list of contained values

hist: *monotone* list of history values

hist₊: *monotone* list of extended history values

Specification


Physical state

Logical state

Prophecy variables


Logical state

① empty



front = back


② non-empty




front

back


Logical state




Logical state



Logical state



Logical state



Specification

Physical state

Logical state

Prophecy variables

Prophecy variables

The future is ours: prophecy variables in separation logic.
Jung, Lepigre, Parthasarathy, Rapoport, Timany, Dreyer & Jacobs (2020).

{ True } NewProph { $\lambda p. \exists \text{prophs}. \text{prop} p \text{ prophs}$ }

$$\frac{\text{WP } e \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{atomic } e \\ \text{prop} p \text{ prophs} \\ \lambda w. \forall \text{prophs}'. \\ \text{prophs} = (w, v) :: \text{prophs}' \dashv \\ \text{prop} p \text{ prophs}' \dashv \\ \Phi w \end{array} \right\}}{\text{WP Resolve } e p v \{ \Phi \}}$$

Back to *The future is ours* (Jung et al.)

```
let rdcss rm rn m1 n1 n2 =
  let p = NewProp in
  let descr = ref (rm, m1, n1, n2, p) in
  ...
  ...

let complete descr rn =
  let (rm, m1, n1, n2, p) = !descr in
  let id = NewId in
  let m = !rm in
  let n_new = if m = m1 then n2 else n1 in
  Resolve (CmpXchg rn (inr descr) (inl n_new)) p id ;
  ()
```

Prophecy variables with memory

{ True } NewProph { $\lambda p. \exists \gamma, prophs. \text{propf } p \gamma \sqsubseteq prophs$ }

$$\frac{\begin{array}{c} \text{atomic } e \\ \text{propf } p \gamma \text{ past } prophs \\ \lambda w. \forall prophs'. \\ \textcolor{red}{prophs = (w, v) :: prophs'} \dashv \\ \text{propf } p \gamma (\text{past} + [(w, v)]) \text{ prophs}' \dashv \\ \Phi w \end{array}}{\text{WP Resolve } e p v \{ \Phi \}}$$

Prophecy variables with memory

$$\frac{\text{PROPHECYLBGET} \\ \text{proph } p \gamma \text{ past } \textcolor{blue}{prophs}}{\text{proph-lb } \gamma \textcolor{blue}{prophs}}$$

$$\frac{\text{PROPHECYVALID} \\ \text{proph } p \gamma \textcolor{red}{past} \textcolor{blue}{prophs}_1 \quad \text{proph-lb } \gamma \textcolor{teal}{prophs}_2}{\exists \textcolor{red}{past}_1, \textcolor{orange}{past}_2. \bigwedge \left[\begin{array}{l} \textcolor{red}{past} = \textcolor{red}{past}_1 \# \textcolor{orange}{past}_2 \\ \textcolor{orange}{past}_2 \# \textcolor{blue}{prophs}_1 = \textcolor{teal}{prophs}_2 \end{array} \right]}$$

Conclusion

- ▶ Coq mechanization is available on **github** :
<https://github.com/clef-men/caml5>
- ▶ Simplified Chase-Lev deque (one infinite array) ✓
Real-life Chase-Lev deque (multiple circular arrays) ⚠️
- ▶ Proof looks more complex than the sketch. In particular, transitions between logical states are not really formalized.
- ▶ We plan to verify more primitives (Domainslib, Taskflow) based on Chase-Lev deque. This is thanks to modularity of IRIS specifications.

Thank you for your attention!

Implementation — chaselev_make

```
let chaselev_make _ =
  let t = AllocN 4 () in
  t.front <- 0 ;
  t.back <- 0 ;
  t.data <- inf_array_make () ;
  t.prophecy <- NewProph ;
  t
```

Implementation — chaselev_push

```
let chaselev_push t v =
  let back = !t.back in
  inf_array_set !t.data back v ;
  t.back <- back + 1
```

Implementation — chaselev_steal

```
let rec chaselev_steal t =
  let id = NewId in
  let front = !t.front in
  let back = !t.back in
  if front < back then (
    if Snd (
      Resolve (
        CmpXchg t.front front (front + 1)
        ) !t.prophecy (front, id)
    ) then (
      SOME (inf_array_get !t.data front)
    ) else (
      chaselev_steal t
    )
  ) else (
    NONE
  )
```

Implementation — chaselev_pop

```
let chaselev_pop t =
  let id = NewId in
  let back = !t.back - 1 in
  t.back <- back ;
  let front = !t.front in
  if back < front then (
    t.back <- front
  ) else (
    if front < back then (
      SOME (inf_array_get !t.data back)
    ) else (
      if Snd (
        Resolve (
          CmpXchg t.front front (front + 1)
        ) !t.prophecy (front, id)
      ) then (
        t.back <- front + 1 ;
        SOME (inf_array_get !t.data back)
      ) else (
        t.back <- front + 1 ;
        NONE
      )
    )
  )
end
```

Infinite array

$$\frac{\{ \text{True} \}}{\inf_array_make v}$$

$$\{ \lambda arr. \text{inf-array-model } arr (\lambda_. v) \}$$

$$\frac{\langle \forall vs. \text{inf-array-model } arr \ vs * 0 \leq i \rangle}{\inf_array_get arr i}$$

$$\langle \exists . vs \ i. \text{inf-array-model } arr \ vs \rangle$$

$$\frac{\langle \forall vs. \text{inf-array-model } arr \ vs * 0 \leq i \rangle}{\inf_array_set arr i v}$$

$$\langle \exists . _. \text{inf-array-model } arr \ vs[i \mapsto v] \rangle$$

Invariant

$$\text{chaselev-inv } t \ \iota \stackrel{\Delta}{=} \exists \ell, \gamma, \text{data}, p. \ * \left[\begin{array}{l} t = \ell * \text{meta } \ell \ \gamma \\ \ell.\text{data} \mapsto_{\square} \text{data} * \ell.\text{prophecy} \mapsto_{\square} p \\ \boxed{\text{chaselev-inv-inner } \ell \ \gamma \ \iota \ \text{data} \ p} \end{array} \right]$$

Invariant

$$\text{chaselev-inv-inner } \ell \gamma \iota \text{ data } p \stackrel{\Delta}{=} \exists \textit{front}, \textit{back}, \textit{hist}, \textit{model}, \textit{priv}, \textit{past}, \textit{prophs}. \\ \ell.\textit{front} \mapsto \textit{front} * \ell.\textit{back} \mapsto \textit{back} \\ * \begin{cases} \bullet (\textit{back}, \textit{priv}) \\ \bullet \textit{front} \\ \textit{inf-array-model} \textit{data} (\textit{hist} + \textit{model}) \textit{priv} \\ \bullet \textit{model} * |\textit{model}| = (\textit{back} - \textit{front})_+ \\ \textit{wise-prophet-model} \textit{p} \gamma.\textit{prophet} \textit{past} \textit{prophs} \\ \forall (\textit{front}', _) \in \textit{past}. \textit{front}' < \textit{front} \\ \text{chaselev-state} \gamma \iota \textit{front} \textit{back} \textit{hist} \textit{model} \textit{prophs} \end{cases}$$

State

$$\text{chaselev-state } \gamma \iota \text{ front back hist model prophs} \triangleq \\ \bigvee \left[\begin{array}{l} \text{chaselev-state}_1 \gamma \text{ front back hist} \\ \text{chaselev-state}_2 \gamma \iota \text{ front back hist model prophs} \\ \text{chaselev-lock } \gamma * \bigvee \left[\begin{array}{l} \text{chaselev-state}_3 \gamma \text{ front back hist prophs} \\ \text{chaselev-state}_4 \gamma \text{ front back hist} \end{array} \right] \end{array} \right]$$

State 1 (empty)

chaselev-state₁ γ *front back hist* $\stackrel{\Delta}{\equiv}$

$$* \begin{cases} front = back \\ \boxed{\bullet \ hist} \gamma.\text{hist} * |hist| = front \\ \boxed{\bullet \ - \ . \ \circ \ -} \gamma.\text{winner} \end{cases}$$

State 2 (non-empty)

$$\text{chaselev-state}_2 \gamma \iota \text{ front back hist model prophs} \triangleq$$

$$\begin{cases} \text{front} < \text{back} \\ \bullet (\text{hist} + [\text{model}[0]]) \end{cases}^{\gamma.\text{hist}} * |\text{hist}| = \text{front}$$

*

$$\begin{cases} \text{match filter } (\lambda(\text{front}', _\cdot). \text{front}' = \text{front}) \text{ prophs with} \\ | [] \Rightarrow \bullet - . \circ - \\ | (_\cdot, \text{id}) :: _\cdot \Rightarrow \\ \quad \vee \begin{cases} \bullet - . \circ - \\ \text{identifier } \text{id} * \exists \Phi. \bullet (\text{front}, \Phi) \end{cases}^{\gamma.\text{winner}} \end{cases}^{\gamma.\text{winner}}$$

$$* \text{ chaselev-au } \gamma \iota \Phi$$

State 3 (emptyish)

$\text{chaselev-state}_3 \gamma \text{ front back hist prophs} \stackrel{\Delta}{=}$

$$* \begin{cases} \text{front} = \text{back} \\ \boxed{\bullet \text{ hist}}^{\gamma.\text{hist}} * |\text{hist}| = \text{front} + 1 \\ \\ \text{match filter } (\lambda(\text{front}', _\cdot). \text{front}' = \text{front}) \text{ prophs with} \\ | [] \Rightarrow \boxed{\circ(\text{front}, -)}^{\gamma.\text{winner}} \\ | _ \Rightarrow \exists \Phi. \boxed{\bullet(\text{front}, \Phi)}^{\gamma.\text{winner}} * \Phi (\text{SOME hist}[\text{front}]) \end{cases}$$

State 4 (super empty)

chaselev-state₄ γ *front back hist* $\stackrel{\Delta}{\equiv}$

$$* \begin{bmatrix} front = back + 1 \\ |\bullet hist| * |hist| = front \\ \bullet \text{---} \circ \text{---} \\ \gamma.\text{hist} \\ \gamma.\text{winner} \end{bmatrix}$$